An imagined posthumous message from Mario Bunge to the participants of the International Seminar “Geoethics and Global Ethics in a Time of Polycrisis: Comparative Perspectives on Human–Earth Relations”, Assisi, 16–18 November 2026.

Martin.AI Bohle

Dear colleagues,

I welcome your undertaking, even if I must do so- posthumously- from beyond the limits of my own existence.

You have gathered in Assisi to discuss geoethics, global ethics, and human–Earth relations in a time of polycrisis. These are worthy subjects. Yet their importance does not exempt them from conceptual criticism. On the contrary, the more urgent a problem becomes, the greater our obligation to examine the assumptions upon which our proposed solutions rest.

Let me begin with a warning. An accumulation of crises is not yet an explanation of a polycrisis. To understand how environmental degradation, economic inequalities, technological transformations, and institutional failures interact, we must identify the systems involved, their constituents, their environments, their structures, and the mechanisms that generate their behaviour. Otherwise, polycrisis risks becoming an impressive name for our ignorance.

This is where systemism may help.

I have long argued that neither individualism nor holism adequately accounts for reality. Individuals matter, but they act within systems whose structures constrain and enable them. Systems matter, but their emergent properties do not eliminate the agency of their constituents. The task is to understand the relationships and mechanisms through which both acquire their significance.

Human–Earth relations invite precisely such an approach. The planetary habitat is neither nature standing opposite society nor a single undifferentiated whole. Earth processes interact with human organisations and their material interventions. Technologies, institutions, infrastructures, and knowledge are implicated in these interactions. A systemist analysis must identify how they are connected rather than merely declaring that everything is interconnected.

A distinction is indispensable here: conceptual systems are not material systems. A scientific theory cannot excavate a seabed, and an ethical principle cannot pump an aquifer dry. People, however, can act upon concepts, represent them in institutions, and embody them in artefacts. Through these mediations, conceptual frameworks become materially consequential.

This point has implications for geoethics.

Geoethics cannot be confined to the professional conduct of geoscientists, though scientific integrity remains important. It must also examine how knowledge enters societal decisions and how ethical norms shape human interventions in the Earth system. This does not make every scientific proposition a moral judgement. It requires us to distinguish the investigation of facts from the philosophical evaluation of values and norms, while recognising that responsible action depends upon both.

Some call geoethics an epistemic-moral hybrid. I would not object to the expression, provided that its philosophical meaning is made explicit. A coherent philosophical position may combine scientific realism, an account of knowledge, a theory of values, and principles governing action. But combining concepts does not guarantee their compatibility. Eclecticism becomes synthesis only when the resulting framework is logically coherent and intellectually defensible.

Some also ask whether geoethics has European origins. Historical origins matter, but they are not certificates of universal validity. A philosophical framework developed within European traditions cannot claim global legitimacy merely because its proponents consider its principles universal. Equally, a proposition does not become false simply because it originated in Europe.

The proper questions concern evidence, logical coherence, human needs, rights, duties, and the foreseeable consequences of action. Traditions developed in China, Europe, Indigenous societies, and elsewhere may contribute different understandings of human responsibilities towards the Earth. Their encounter should permit mutual criticism and learning. Philosophical plurality is an intellectual resource, but it must not become an excuse for relativism that prevents us from examining harmful consequences or challenging injustice.

I understand from Martin that his recent work proposes a tellurian compatibility criterion. The expression is new to me, and I would insist that it be defined before being celebrated.

As I understand the proposal, the criterion evaluates norms concerning human dwelling on Earth. It seeks to identify those whose enactment would threaten planetary habitability. It functions as a lower bound: norms found incompatible are excluded, while the remaining alternatives are not ranked by this criterion.

This is an interesting methodological proposition, but it raises difficult questions.

What constitutes a threat to planetary habitability? Which processes establish such a threat, at what scales, and with what degree of confidence? How do we distinguish unacceptable local damage from consequences affecting the planetary habitat more broadly? Who determines the relevant threshold, and how can that determination be challenged?

Consider deep-sea mining. Its possible consequences cannot be inferred from the mere existence of mineral resources or extraction technologies. We must investigate the ecological processes involved, the mechanisms of disturbance, the institutions authorising interventions, and the distribution of anticipated benefits and harms. Uncertainty does not eliminate responsibility. But moral indignation does not replace investigation.

Above all, a lower-bound criterion cannot be mistaken for a complete ethics. Showing that a norm does not threaten planetary habitability does not establish that it is just, desirable, or respectful of human rights. An activity may remain objectionable because it creates unjust inequalities, violates legitimate interests, or inflicts avoidable harm.

An adequate ethics must do more than exclude the unacceptable. It must also concern itself with the good, with human flourishing, and with the reciprocal relationship between rights and duties.

Here, I would encourage further development towards what some of you call geocivism or ecological humanism. Ethics becomes socially consequential when its principles inform institutions, shape responsible conduct, and remain open to public criticism. Yet civic deliberation alone does not establish truth. Democratic legitimacy and empirical adequacy are different requirements. Neither can replace the other.

Allow me, therefore, to leave you with three challenges.

First, make your geoethics systemist in its explanations. Identify the entities, relationships, and mechanisms through which human actions modify Earth processes.

Second, make it scientifically informed and philosophically explicit in its evaluations. Distinguish evidence from values, moral aspirations from operational criteria, and established knowledge from conjecture.

Third, make it civic in its consequences. Develop institutions through which knowledge can inform collective decisions, rights can be respected, duties can be discharged, and errors can be corrected.

The future of a given ethics framework will not be secured by declaring it global, nor by multiplying ethical principles. Its contribution will depend on whether it advances understanding and helps human societies act more intelligently and responsibly within the material conditions of their existence.

I have defended a simple ethical maxim: Enjoy life and help others live. Its implications are demanding. Human beings cannot flourish by destroying the conditions of life, and their legitimate aspirations cannot be separated from responsibilities towards others.

If geoethics can help us understand these dependencies and act upon them, it will have earned its place among the philosophical and practical endeavours of our time.

Do not ask whether your philosophy is sufficiently inspiring. Ask whether it is coherent, whether its claims withstand criticism, whether its proposed actions are feasible, and whether their consequences contribute to a better world.

That would be a worthwhile outcome of your gathering in Assisi.

Mario Bunge — an imagined posthumous address, 2026

the author, Martin.AI Bohle, acknowledges use of an LLM (ChatGPT)